The following are our prerequisites for an inspection of the secure vehicle compound on the disused airfield at the north side of Albemarle Barracks, Stamfordham.

The prerequisites are founded on those adopted by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Authority  (IAEA) under Resolution 1441 of the Security Council, and as set out by the UNMOVIC/IAEA letter to the Iraq Presidential Office of 8th October 2002. In the spirit of cooperation, however, we do not insist on such intrusive inspections, and have accordingly relaxed or waived some of the prerequisites imposed on Iraq.

1)The inspection team has the right to determine the number and identities of inspectors required for access to the site.

2)As the site is an additional site, that has not been declared as a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) facility by the government or previously inspected by the IAEA, the inspectors will provide a Notification of Inspection (NIS) upon arrival at the site.

3)The inspection is to be carried out on a date convenient for the inspectors, and may have to be arranged outside normal working hours, including in the evening or at a weekend.

4)If the inspection is to be held after the hours of daylight, full lighting of the site will be provided, free of charge.

5)The inspectors may use any type of voice or data transmission, including satellite and/or inland networks. This will be facilitated by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and there will be no interference with the inspectors’ communications.

6)The inspectors will be allowed full access to all parts of the site, both outside and inside the security fence, including underground areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect.

7)The inspectors shall in particular have the right to photograph any parts of the site, inside or outside, and to examine and take copies of records or documentation relating to the use of the site.

8)The inspection shall be facilitated by an official involved in the operational use of the site by the MOD, who shall be available for interview by the inspectors.

9)There will be no searching of the inspection personnel or of official or personal baggage. The MOD or its agents shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the inspection team, and their equipment shall not be seized or in any way tampered with.

Acceptance of these prerequisites is to be confirmed by the MOD within seven days of sending this notice, and suitable inspection dates are to be offered by 8th December 2002.

The Tyneside Citizens’ Inspection Agency,

Recalling that there exists at the north side of Albemarle military barracks, at Stamfordham, Northumberland, a disused airfield, part of which is used as a secure vehicle compound,

Noting that this compound has notoriously and long been alleged to be used in the transportation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or their components, and particularly in the transportation of Trident nuclear warheads from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Burghfield to the Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) Coulport,

Recalling that the British government, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1970 (NPT), is obliged under Article VI of that treaty to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,”

Recalling also the unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in July 1996, that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,”

Recalling further the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” agreed by the UK government at the NPT review conference in May 2000,

Noting the requirements for intrusive and unconditional inspections of WMD facilities imposed on Iraq by Resolution 1441 (2002) of the United Nations Security Council,

Noting that the said compound was last inspected in 1998 by members of the Nuclear Weapons Inspectorate (Northumbria), who served a “notice to quit” on the compound fence, notwithstanding which it has continued in use for WMD transports,

Determined to secure full compliance with the international obligations of the government, and with the spirit of the conditions imposed on other countries that hold or threaten the use of WMD,

Requests therefore that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) shall, not later than 30 days from the date of the Security Council Resolution 1441, provide to us, for reporting to the local community and the public generally, a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of the use of the ‘secure vehicle compound’ at Albemarle Barracks (formerly Ouston airfield), for the transportation of WMD and their components; in particular, requires the declaration to include the following information as a minimum:

•Past use of facility since 1998: dates of visits by military convoys, destinations of those convoys and loading details

•Nature of any records, paperwork or documentation for the facility, whether maintained on-site or elsewhere

•Role of the facility within the government’s WMD programme

•Current details of site: details of all on-site facilities, buildings, equipment and storage areas, their location and use

•Whether the facility is now shut down or still available for future use

•Dates for planned future use of the site

•Expected date for decommissioning of site

This declaration is to be supplied in writing by the 8th December, 2002.

27 November 2002

Dear Ministry,

As you are no doubt aware, the United Nations Security Council has imposed an “enhanced inspection regime” on Iraq, under its Resolution 1441 of 8th November 2002.

The inspection regime applies to all aspects of Iraq’s alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme. The UK’s own WMD programme is established and well-known, and is based on a fleet of Trident submarines, holding between them some 144 100-kiloton warheads, each 8 times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. One Trident submarine is on patrol at all times. We can assume, therefore, that Resolution 1441 applies properly to inspections of the UK’s WMD sites as it does to Iraq’s.

Albemarle Barracks includes, close to its northern edge, a secure vehicle compound, which is regularly used by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and RAF for the transportation of nuclear warheads. A local team of inspectors therefore requires access to visit this compound, and to compile a report on it, for circulation to the general public, to members of the Security Council through government representatives to the United Nations, and to NGOs.

Enclosed you will find our prerequisites for such an inspection, together with our formal request for a declaration on the use of the facility. We hope that you will accept our requests and cooperate fully with the inspection. You will note that we expect you to want to follow a similar timetable to that imposed on, and so far agreed by, Iraq. We look forward to a full acceptance of the inspection prerequisites within 7 days of the date of this letter, and to your declaration on the use of the facility by 8th December 2002. Please address all communications to the Tyneside CIA at the address above.

To ensure that our own inspection activities are subject to public scrutiny and accountability, this is an open letter and will be copied to the local press.

Yours sincerely,

on behalf of Tyneside Citizens’ Inspection Agency:

Roger Nettleship, Nicola Sugden, Monica Frisch, Michael Rabley, Lottie Hann, Chris Randall, Andrew Gray